Attribute-based differentiation of alternatives by Keisler, Jeffrey
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Management Science and Information Systems
Faculty Publication Series Management Science and Information Systems
11-1-2002
Attribute-based differentiation of alternatives
Jeffrey Keisler
University of Massachusetts Boston, jeff.keisler@umb.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/msis_faculty_pubs
Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Strategic
Management Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management Science and Information Systems at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Management Science and Information Systems Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keisler, Jeffrey, "Attribute-based differentiation of alternatives" (2002). Management Science and Information Systems Faculty Publication
Series. Paper 39.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/msis_faculty_pubs/39
Attribute-based differentiation of strategic alternatives  
 
Jeffrey M. Keisler  
Assistant Professor 
College of Management 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
5
th
 Floor McCormack Hall, Room 230 
100 Morrissey Boulevard 
Boston, MA 02125 
jeff.keisler@umb.edu 
phone: 617-287-7738 
fax: 617-287-7877 
 
 
 
Submitted to: Journal of Multi-criteria Decision Analysis
Attribute-based differentiation of strategic alternatives  
 
Abstract: An intermediate step is introduced to the decision dialogue process for decision 
analysis. Alternatives are refined after they have been generated within a strategy table 
but before they are subject to more detailed evaluation. Two or more judges create a 
subjective mapping from alternatives to attributes that will later be mapped to criteria. In 
strategy tables, each of the alternative strategies consists of a coherent set of choices 
made across several decisions that are to be coordinated. These strategic alternatives are 
modified so as to increase their differentiation in the attribute space, rather than in the 
decision space alone. When criteria weights are unknown, the best alternative from the 
modified set may be superior to the best alternative from the original set. Furthermore, 
analysis of the resulting alternatives may yield a better mapping of the value response 
surface for the action space, in the sense that this mapping leads to eventual construction 
of a higher value alternative. Results are reported for a consulting engagement 
incorporating the proposed step. 
 
Keywords: Alternative generation, creativity, multi-criteria decision analysis, decision-
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1. Introduction 
A quality decision process requires the generation of a set of creative and doable 
alternatives (Howard, 1988), and these alternatives should be significantly different from 
one another (Matheson and Matheson, 1998). Typically, alternatives are understood to be 
significantly different when they differ across many sub-decisions. If relatively few 
alternatives can be investigated in detail, there are few degrees of freedom with which to 
generate such differences and it is important that the differences between alternatives be 
important ones. But how can we tell until we’ve analyzed them? 
If the reason for seeking such differentiation is to ensure that all promising 
possibilities are examined, it may be more useful to strive for alternatives that are 
differentiated in the attribute space rather than in the control space. This MCDA-inspired 
idea was translated into a specific modification to the Decision Dialogue Process (DDP), 
developed by Howard, Matheson and others at Strategic Decisions Group and its clients 
(e.g., Barabba, 1995). This modification was applied in a pharmaceutical product 
decision analysis, with promising results. Specifically, after alternatives were generated 
using a strategy table, a set of attributes was identified. Alternatives were qualitatively 
scored against these attributes, and then were modified in order to increase their 
differentiation with respect to the attributes. At the time it occurred, this application was 
not intended as a scholarly study, but its archival information was sufficient to construct 
an illustrative case.  
Section 2 gives background on approaches to alternative generation in decision 
analysis, along with an interpretation that motivates modifying the DDP. Section 3 
describes the proposed new step in detail, including its practical application. Section 4 
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presents the case study. Results include the quantitative output obtained during the new 
step, specifically, its measures of differentiation as well as levels of agreement about the 
scores of alternatives. These outputs were used to materially improve the set of 
alternatives. Section 5 discusses lessons learned from the engagement and potential future 
research. 
 
2. Background 
Decision analytic practice includes numerous techniques for alternative 
generation. These techniques can be viewed as variations on a more or less common 
process, each variation having its specific purpose. The approach described here, 
attribute-based differentiation of strategic alternatives, will combine elements of several 
of these techniques. The literature on decision analytic processes does not offer much 
explanation for why differentiation of alternatives is desirable – although no one argues 
that it isn’t. We should first articulate the rationale.  There seem to be two main reasons 
for differentiation: ensuring that potentially strong alternatives are not missed, and 
exploring more broadly what drives value.  
If alternatives are not significantly different, it is likely that other alternatives that 
are significantly different have been overlooked – and one of them might be better. If 
there are to be meaningful alternatives, there must be tradeoffs. If the value associated 
with the attributes that must be traded off and the exact magnitude of those tradeoffs 
cannot be known in advance, then it is imprudent to rule out certain tradeoffs. For 
example, a consumer intending to purchase a used car is looking for a “bargain” in the 
sense that the attributes on which the car performs well are of high value to that consumer 
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but are attainable because the market does not value them so highly, while the attributes 
that the market values highly are not of much importance the consumer. If the consumer 
never considers cars with, say, low acceleration, a car that is otherwise especially 
attractive, might be overlooked. Such a neglected option could be more attractive than 
other choices, depending on the precise weights the consumer eventually assigns to 
various attributes. 
Especially when the exact mapping from alternatives to criteria is not known at 
the time alternatives are generated, the best alternative from a well-differentiated set of 
alternatives is likely to have higher value than the best alternative from a narrow set 
where no intentional pre-processing of alternatives has occurred. The reasoning here is 
that when the value of alternatives to be examined is uncertain, and when the best 
alternative from the set will eventually be chosen, the option value inherent in the 
alternative set is maximized by maximizing variance in the value of possible outcomes. 
Harrison and March (1984) argued on similar lines that expected value increases in the 
number of alternatives generated, and in the heterogeneity of those alternatives.  
In practice, there is additional value to considering even alternatives that are not 
selected. If we only consider a narrow range of alternatives, then we will only learn about 
what drives value to the decision maker over a narrow range. By considering a wider 
range of alternatives, the natural outcome of the decision analytic process will be a richer 
understanding of what makes alternatives attractive. This, in turn, can lead to more 
efficient development of high-value alternatives. Variations on these two reasons help 
motivate the treatment of alternatives in most of the processes addressed here. 
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MCDA processes: Henig and Buchanan (1996) provide a useful framework for 
discussing alternative generation techniques. They divide decision models into two parts: 
an (ideally) objective mapping from alternatives to attributes, and a subjective mapping 
from attributes to criteria, i.e., what Keeney (1992) calls fundamental objectives. An 
analytical decision process must include what they call component identification (of the 
alternatives and criteria themselves), identification of attributes (which they include as 
part of the mapping step), and, as part of an overall iterative process, understanding the 
decision maker’s preferences and expanding the set of alternatives.   
In such a process, several characteristics would be desirable in an alternative set.  
Specifically, there should be a few well-differentiated alternatives. These alternatives 
should present high potential value, and they should be realistic. These desiderata for an 
alternative set are intuitively appealing for the reasons described above.  
Attribute-based methods: These methods are practical when there are relatively 
few alternatives, as they keep the number of assessments and computations reasonable. 
Keller and Ho (1988) describe and recommend attribute-based methods of alternative 
generation, where a set of alternatives is narrowed down by screening against attributes, 
i.e., by using “feed-forward”. This minimizes time spent analyzing less-promising 
alternatives. Value focused thinking (Keeney, 1992) extends this idea and identifies key 
objectives as a precursor to alternative generation, so that all alternatives generated are 
likely to have high value; more complete models are then constructed to evaluate and 
refine alternatives. Outranking techniques (Jaskiewicz and Slowinski, 1997) implement 
in multi-criteria programming environments something resembling Keller and Ho’s idea. 
Outranking is applicable when the range of alternatives can be expressed as a region in n-
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space and where there is partial information about the relationships between attributes 
and criteria. In this approach, after attributes and the directions in which change is 
desirable are identified, the set of non-dominated corner solutions is enumerated and is 
fairly small. For these solutions, further development of local preference models ensues. 
Early ranking: A technique often used by Stewart (e.g., Stewart and Scott, 1995) 
is to add an intermediate step of ranking, holistically, each alternative against each 
attribute on a 0-100 scale. At this point, formal measures are not yet developed and 
attributes have not yet been mapped to criteria. Stewart proposes using this “quick and 
dirty” method to refine the set of alternatives in order to find ones that perform well 
against the attributes. No explicit weighting scheme is used, but at the very least, this 
approach identifies dominated alternatives. If all attributes are treated equally at this 
point, Stewart’s method can be thought of as a heuristic that will tend to pick higher 
performing alternatives. Research on SMART techniques (e.g., Edwards and Barron, 
1994) suggests that this could work well. While Stewart’s approach is typically used to 
reduce the set of alternatives based on preliminary information, its successful application 
suggests that there is potential value to performing more general manipulations of the set 
of alternatives based on preliminary information. 
 DDP and Strategy Tables: According to Howard’s decision quality framework, 
alternatives must be creative and well differentiated. Within Howard’s Stanford school of 
decision analysis, commonly identified with the DDP, strategy tables are used to generate 
strategic alternatives (also called strategies), i.e., alternatives composed of coordinated 
choices over a set of decisions. A strategy table contains a column for each decision 
dimension (not necessarily quantitative), and for each decision dimension, the choice set 
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is laid out with one possible selection in each row. Strategy tables are especially well 
suited to situations where there are more than a few simple alternatives, and where 
different dimensions of the action space are not easily quantified (unlike linear 
programming).  
A rich description of the practical use of strategy tables is given in Matheson and 
Matheson (1998, p. 185), who define a strategy table as “a matrix that casts alternative 
strategies against the decisions that would logically flow from them.” They describe the 
process of constructing a strategy table as follows (ibid, p. 187):  
“In the remaining columns of the table [the project team] listed the major decision areas the 
company would need to address to flesh out these strategies. The heading of each column 
describes the decision area and the entries under it represent strategic options in that area. A 
complete strategic alternative (or strategy) was specified by selecting one option from each 
column and connecting them to make a path from the theme through their choices in each column. 
… Over the course of several weeks, the team came up with new strategy themes, defined them 
carefully by making the appropriate choices in each column, adding columns for new decision 
areas or new options within decision areas, compared them, and then boiled them down to a small 
set. The final set of strategic alternatives was selected to define several significantly different 
strategic visions of how to manage the overall business. After approval of the entire set by the 
decision team, each strategy was slated for evaluation in the next phase of the DDP.” 
In business settings, the DDP typically (and intentionally) focuses on a single 
criterion, maximization of expected net present value. Alternative generation is only one 
phase. In the complete DDP process, differentiated alternatives are constructed as diverse 
paths through the strategy table, where each path represents a logically consistent theme. 
After the set of alternatives is generated, influence diagrams are used to model the 
relationship between decisions and value. A deterministic model is created, and after 
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preliminary assessments, “tornado diagrams” are constructed using sensitivity analysis. 
These in turn are used to select variables to incorporate in a full probabilistic analysis 
and, after value of information calculations are performed, a final decision is made.  Each 
stage of the process is marked by a meeting in which a conversation is facilitated between 
a senior “decision board” and a “decision team consisting of decision analysts and staff 
from the client. The meeting ends with agreement about which parts of the model are 
complete, and which assumptions are accepted, along with commitments on further 
action and directions for analysis.  
Iteration: Several approaches exist along these lines. Requisite decision 
modeling (Phillips, 1984) makes explicit the idea that any part of the decision model may 
be refined if, based on the assessment at that time, it seems refinement would 
significantly improve the decision.  
The Unifying Vision Process or UVP described by Kusnic and Owen (1992), has 
become an important variation of the DDP. With the UVP, there is a plan to design a new 
“hybrid” alternative based on sensitivity analysis-type insights from the models that are 
developed to evaluate an initial set of alternatives. In concept, the UVP starts with a set of 
feasible alternatives from which the analyst iterates, stitching together pieces of each 
alternative into combinations that approach a more optimal solution. (In contrast, 
Keeney’s value focused thinking approach may involve iteration in which a set of 
creative alternatives, each of which is intended to perform well on some subset of the key 
objectives, is stitched together by first taking the union of many of these actions and then 
easing back the plan until it is feasible.) Similarly, Corner et al (2001) suggest an 
approach that switches between alternative generation and refinement of the value 
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function. A more formal approach that explicitly seeks to map out the value 
corresponding to various alternative inputs is Bauer et al’s (1999) response surface 
mapping (RSM). In this approach, numerous points in the attribute space are selected for 
detailed evaluation. These assessments are then used to form a response surface map that 
interpolates between the assessed points. Detailed evaluation of points is costly, so RSM 
incorporates principles of experimental design to construct as robust a map as possible.   
In both of these iterative processes, new alternatives are defined after a model is 
built to evaluate other specific alternatives. Here, the set of alternatives that are first used 
for the model should be constructed so as to facilitate learning that will lead to eventual 
discovery of high value alternatives. It seems that differentiation would be even more 
important with such an iterative process than with a sequential process.  
 
3. Synthesis 
The ideal situation with which we are concerned has the following characteristics: 
we may want to use iteration and may want to create a RSM, but not with so formal a 
mapping process. We also want to map high value regions. We are willing to refine the 
set of alternatives.  Several challenging factors may be present: feasibility is not easily 
achieved, so we want to start with feasibility and work up toward optimality; the mapping 
from attributes to criteria is complex and not easily identified; and tradeoffs will likely be 
necessary. These characteristics are common in many, if not most, decision contexts, 
particularly the difficult task of defining the means-ends relationships between attributes 
and criteria. Using elements of the various approaches, we can propose using the process 
sketched below: 
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(1) Define a set of alternatives, using strategy tables in the usual DDP.   
(2) Construct (quickly and at low cost) a coarse model relating alternatives to 
attributes, scoring it using Stewart’s method, and identify the directional 
relationship between attributes and criteria.  
(3) Then, in the spirit of Keller and Ho and other attribute-based approaches, use 
this assessment to refine the alternatives.  
(4) In the spirit of RSM, take measures of the spread of alternatives across 
attributes and then refine alternatives (as does Philips) to get a set of points to 
evaluate that better spans the attribute space (rather than the input space).   
(5) Use this as the input to the rest of the process (developing complete mapping 
from alternatives to criteria) and then  
(6) Either select the best alternative (with possible refinements) or use insights 
from this mapping to generate a new better alternative (as in the UVP).  
To enable the creation of high-impact alternatives, the columns of a strategy table 
should contain not only those quantities over which decision makers have the most 
control, but also those that are most easily controlled in general, and those whose effects 
are most important. By merging MCDA with strategy tables, we can identify value 
drivers and create alternatives to affect them, even before their precise nature is known.  
If there is a high level of control over quantities that are not especially valuable, 
we should ask whether there is a cost to having the control and, if so, whether it should be 
abandoned, or whether there is some other possible route to deriving value from that 
control. An effective strategy table would have a high correlation between controllable 
variables, attributes that can be influenced, and important criteria, i.e., it would explore 
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the action space in the right dimensions.  We are not at this stage aiming to create all 
high-value alternatives. It is challenging enough to pursue the more modest goal of 
developing well-differentiated alternatives.     
The mathematical justification for this type of differntiation is easily seen in a 
linear programming setting. Other things being equal, the more alternatives differ in 
terms of resource allocations, the more we expect the alternatives to diverge in terms of 
value. However, even in the simple case where the value of an alternative is the product 
of an input vector, an input-output matrix and a price vector, the Cartesian distance 
between two input vectors alone does not reliably predict their difference in value.  
For instance, consider the following situation in which we wish to compare 
alternative inputs. The input-output matrix is 2 x 2, each entry in it is 1, and outputs are 
transformed to a single value by the price vector: (1, 1). If we have as alternatives the two 
input vectors X1: (1, -1) and X2: (–1, 1), resulting in an output vector of (0, 0) in each 
case, the Cartesian distance between the alternatives is 2√2 in the input space, while the 
distance between them in the attribute space (as well as in value) is 0. The input vectors 
X1: (1, -1) and X2’: (1.5, -0.5) are separated by a Cartesian distance between them of 
1/√2, i.e., they are closer together than X1 and X2. But their outputs (0, 0) and (1, 1) have 
a Cartesian distance of √2 in the attribute (output) space and their resulting values differ 
by 2.0.  With rough information about the price vector, one could correctly predict that 
the second pair of alternatives has greater difference in value based on the distance 
between the output vectors, in spite of the fact that this pair has smaller distance between 
the input vectors.  
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In real situations, of course, there is a nearly infinite range of possible 
relationships between actions and value, but the same thinking ought to apply. If we want 
the alternative generation phase to produce a set of well-differentiated alternatives, then 
even rough estimates of how alternatives perform against different attributes should help.   
In the case study that follows, this concept was implemented at the end of the 
alternative-generation phase in the DDP, but prior to the detailed evaluation of the 
different alternatives. The plan was for a process where, after the initial strategy table and 
a first set of alternatives has been developed, the decision team does the following:  
1) Identifies a list of attributes anticipated to be significant value drivers. 
2) Holistically rates each alternative as being in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th quartiles of what 
could be expected for each attribute, where the 1
st
 quartile is most desirable 
(Stewart’s 0-100 scales might be too fine for this purpose). This wording is similar in 
spirit to commonly used qualitative scales where 1 = Excellent, 2 = Good, 3 = Fair, 
and 4 = Poor. Although summary statistics from such scales must be taken with a 
grain of salt, survey results
1
 of this nature are commonly used.   
3) Computes (easily found) descriptive statistics for each of the following: 
  Inter-judge agreement on scores for alternatives  
  Inter-judge agreement on scores for each attribute 
  Spread of scores among alternatives (over all attributes) 
  Spread of scores across each attribute  
                                                 
1
 We would ideally use ratings from multiple judges to help ensure reliability, given the preliminary nature 
of the attributes used here.  Although in the case study the judges were the decision analysts, actual 
decision makers could certainly serve as judges in addition to or instead of the analysts. 
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4) Uses results from (3) for guidance about where to refine definitions, utilizing 
comparisons of scores from different judges in a manner reminiscent of Delphi 
techniques, (Sackman, 1975), and  
5) Refines the original strategy table and alternative set in order to increase the 
differentiation of alternatives with respect to attributes. The abstract guidance from 
(4) can be applied by inquiring about specific ways in which, by modifying an 
alternative in a manner that decreases performance on one attribute, it would be 
possible to increase performance on another attribute. We might expect these prompts 
to suffice because they are similar to techniques that Keeney (1992) uses 
successfully, i.e., by asking decision makers to develop alternatives that maximize a 
single attribute score.   
 
4. Application  
4.1 Case study    
The proposed approach was used in a decision analysis consulting engagement at 
a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company. Consistent with the hurdles to doing research as 
a practitioner, as described by Platts (1996), this application was intended primarily to be 
of benefit to the client, and not to be a controlled experiment in which a pre-determined 
method would be compared against a control situation. Nonetheless, it was a conscious 
attempt at innovation and good records were kept. The process followed the proposed 
plan for the most part, differing in minor details where necessary for the flow of the 
engagement.  
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For this discussion, it is necessary to use several technical terms commonly heard 
in the pharmaceutical industry: A compound is a specific chemical formulation used as a 
medicine. A trial is (in the U.S.) a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) approved 
scientific test of a compound used in a specified way on a selected set of subjects. An 
endpoint is a target quantity that is to be measured by a trial, e.g., 50% rate of absorption 
of a fixed dose of medicine achieved by 90% of subjects within 40 minutes. An 
indication is a medical use approved by the FDA based on the results of trials for a 
compound.  
The new step was introduced a few days after it was informally proposed (thanks 
to a cooperative project manager and client). The business problem was that a 
pharmaceutical product that had been generating in the hundreds of millions in annual 
revenue was past the end of its patent life. For reasons relating to the difficulty of 
obtaining regulatory approval and of manufacturing, and the medical complexity of using 
this product, the company was still enjoying strong profitability from it. However, in 
several of the medical indications, there were potential regulatory concerns on the 
horizon, as well as potential competition.
2
  
The company had engaged decision analysis consultants to develop a plan of 
action for the product area, with the primary objective being to maximize net present 
value. We had anticipated that during the alternative generation phase of this project, a 
key challenge would be creating sufficiently well differentiated alternatives (because of 
our own difficulty in imagining them), and this fact motivated use of the approach 
                                                 
2
 Company and product details are disguised. This example bears a similarity to one given by 
Philips’ in his comments on Henig & Buchanan (1996), but the similarity is entirely coincidental.  
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described here. Materials were prepared to run this as an exercise with the client team. In 
the actual case we explained the exercise to the client team, but ran out of meeting time 
after the client team generated a strategy table.  
The most easily identified decisions involved whether to run each of many 
possible trials for each of the three possible compounds. We determined that, although 
specifying these trials would be an essential piece of implementation, it would not suffice 
to merely construct and compare lists of possible trials. Alternatives defined in this way 
would be hard to interpret other than literally – and therefore hard to connect to a theme 
and thus to other necessary business decisions. We quickly gravitated toward a more 
business-oriented strategy table.  
The actual strategies varied across the following resource dimensions:  
 investment in trials for uses that are already common in practice although not 
explicitly approved by the FDA, with specific endpoints that could improve the 
product’s credibility with physicians (possible combinations of trials),  
 investment in capacity (possible different levels for different products),  
 investment in new indications (different indications for different products) 
 investment in sales and marketing,  
 speed of the various tests (compressing tests in time and performing multiple 
simultaneous tests could increase costs.)   
 The team was familiar with the financial commitments each of these types of 
investments would require, but the dollar amounts were not explicitly estimated. Using 
this strategy table, the client’s core decision team (with consultants facilitating) generated 
a set of alternative strategies. They started with themes and then constructed paths 
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through the strategy table consistent with those themes. As alternative strategies were 
defined, they were tweaked to ensure that they did not have much overlap, and for each 
column most of the alternatives implied different choices. In the stylized version of our 
strategy table shown in Table 1, the alternatives appear to be well differentiated. The five 
strategies were:  
 “Minimum Investment” (I): Keep the current product’s market share as long as 
possible without significant new investment in drug trials, production capacity or 
new medical indications. 
 “Grow” market (G): Attempt to expand the market for the product with current 
and closely related medical indications. 
 “Switch” product (S): Attempt to maintain the core market by switching it to a 
new and improved chemical formulation of the product (one with similar effects, 
but better). 
 “Leverage” product (L): Attempt to expand the market for the product by getting 
new indications and selling additional products related to current medical 
indications. 
 “Multi-use” products (U): Maintain a family of related formulations, marketing 
different formulations for different market segments and indications. 
 Each strategy is thus a path through the table defined in terms of the choices 
indicated by its code for each of the decisions that must be coordinated. For example, the 
“Grow” strategy (G) would allocate a high level of resources to capacity, medium 
resources to running trials for safety and efficacy, and low (but non-zero) resources to 
  
 
16 
running other trials, developing indications, enhancing sales and marketing, and speeding 
up the product development cycle. 
 Following the meeting with the client team, the project manager and I (judges A 
and B) constructed a list of attribute dimensions that might be of interest to decision 
makers. Although we had enough experience to generate a nearly complete list based on 
analyses for similar decisions, it would be better, if practical, to involve the client team in 
this step. The attributes we identified along with their orientiations were as follows:  
 Minimize marketing complexity (similar products could cause confusion) 
 Minimize organizational complexity (involving multiple divisions) 
 Minimize technical risk (efficacy and safety of different formulations are 
uncertain pending clinical trials at early and later phases) 
 Minimize regulatory risk (regulators have concerns about certain formulations, 
production methods, and uses, and overcoming these would require greater 
lobbying effort and success) 
 Minimize commercial downside risk (do not want to lose existing market share) 
 Maximize commercial upside potential (want to penetrate new market segments) 
 Minimize investment resources required  
 Minimize time required to market  
At this point, we did not expect to be able to quantify alternatives against these 
attributes and we did not intend to conclude the project with a multi-attribute utility 
analysis.  Note, the term “attribute” as used here is close to what Keeney calls a “means 
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objective.”3 As is typical for this type of engagement, it was already established that the 
primary “end” objective  (criterion) would be to maximize expected net present value 
(ENPV) for the product family. We suspected that these attributes would all drive ENPV 
in an as yet to be defined way and hoped that by making them explicit early in the 
decision process, we would focus subsequent analysis.  We fully anticipated that with 
more detailed analysis later on, a model that further clarified these attributes would be 
developed (in the form of a detailed financial model with intermediate variables 
resembling our attributes). In order to refine alternatives before entering the time-
consuming modeling phase of the project, we chose to use this list as is.  
After developing the list of attributes, we each scored each of the alternatives on a 
scale from 1 (best) to 4 (worst) for each attribute dimension  (tables 2a and 2b). These 
were entered in a spreadsheet, and data in these and the other tables was presented to the 
client in the form of bar graphs.  The spreadsheet calculated statistics such as standard 
deviation on each attribute measure across alternatives (table 3), as well as correlation 
between judges on attribute measures and by alternative. To calculate these measures 
required nothing more complex than application of standard spreadsheet functions, 
specifically: standard deviation, correlation, average, and basic arithmetic (sometimes 
with arrays).  
Some of the statistics had obvious, if superficial, implications. A high correlation 
between judges’ scores in a given dimension indicated sufficient clarity to use the 
findings about that dimension. One use of the correlation statistic was as a warning that 
                                                 
3
 If there was a richer set of final criteria, the same technique could be used, but the process of identifying 
and scoring preliminary criteria might merit more effort with correspondingly greater benefit. We could 
call this criteria-based-differentiation. It could also work to apply the technique twice, first to create a more 
differentiated set of feasible alternatives with respect to attributes and use this as a basis to generate a more 
differentiated set of alternatives with respect to criteria.  
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later models would need more detail to fully capture these considerations. Where the 
standard deviation statistic among attribute scores is high, it means the alternative set 
provides good coverage on an attribute dimension. Where there is high correlation 
between scores for a pair of alternatives, it means there is insufficient differentiation 
between them. If none of the correlations is high, this indicates significant differentiation.  
  In the rightmost column of table 3, the alternatives’ average scores (simply 
assuming equally weighted attributes) lie within a narrow range. Inspection of the table 
confirms that no one alternative is dominated on all dimensions by any other, so we did 
not immediately eliminate any of them. The average scores across alternatives (for both 
judges) for the attributes all lie between 2.1 and 2.7, again suggesting that attributes have 
not been treated as constraints in creating the alternatives, i.e., there is no attribute where 
all the alternatives were defined so as to maximize that attribute. 
At this point, it is interesting to compare the set of alternatives presented in an 
attribute-based strategy table (table 4), with the alternative-based strategy table (table 1).  
The level of differentiation appears lower when alternative strategies are viewed in terms 
of attributes rather than decision dimensions. Specifically, we observe in table 4 several 
dimensions in which two or more alternatives perform at the same level while there are 
other performance levels that are not achieved by any of the alternatives. Any 
interpretation of the patterns here is, of course, dependent on the judges’ estimates being 
reliable. With the small number of judges, gaps in table 4 might appear by chance if 
judgments were noisy. This concern is somewhat alleviated by the fact that judgments 
were informally reviewed when presented to members of the client team.  
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--- INSERT TABLE  4 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The difference in attribute scores across alternatives was substantial. The standard 
deviation of scores across alternatives (in the bottom row of table 3) is near 1.0 for most 
of the attributes, but is somewhat lower (0.74) for regulatory risk and much lower (0.45) 
for commercial risk. This suggests that the alternatives may reflect less inclination on the 
part of the client team to trade off  performance on these two attributes for performance 
on other attributes.  
Although the main reason for collecting the data was to evaluate alternatives, we 
can deduce from the same data something about how well defined our attributes are in 
relation to the alternatives by looking at the inter-judge consistency. This would be a 
more valid measure with more judges (and with judges from the client organization). 
Even with two judges, however, the results provided a rough indication of where further 
work on definition was needed. If several judges from the client had participated, the 
same type of results would be obtained but they could be used with more confidence. The 
spreadsheet calculated both the simple Cartesian distance between the two sets of 
assessments and the correlation between them, as shown in table 5.  
 
--- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ---  
 
There was generally high correlation in the judges’ assessments of the different 
alternatives on each attribute. The exceptions were a low correlation (0.48) on regulatory 
risk, and zero correlation on judgments of commercial downside risk; we discussed this 
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lack of agreement but concluded that it was not caused by a poorly defined attribute, but 
rather because the alternatives simply did not show much variation here.  
Comparing each judge’s scores one alternative at a time, we found that there was 
low agreement (0.51) on the attributes of the “Grow” strategy. Judges A and B had very 
different views of the relative attributes of “Grow” and “Leverage” (they were negatively 
correlated for judge B, and positively correlated for judge A, and essentially uncorrelated 
in our average scorings), even though we agreed on the resource allocations for them. We 
felt that what happened was that the “themes” that go with these strategic alternatives 
were unclear; when that happens there are more gaps (unarticulated or assumed 
decisions) that judges must fill and these judgments may differ. In particular, the “Grow” 
strategy may not be so well defined as the “Switch” and “Minimum Investment” 
strategies. This was noted as a point to revisit at the next decision team meeting.  
The similarity of individual alternatives is estimated in table 6. Here, the 
correlations between ratings for each pair of alternatives are calculated with a simple 
spreadsheet formula copied to cells in a table. The “Minimum Investment” strategy is 
weakly correlated with “Grow” and has a strong negative correlation with the other 
alternatives. The “Grow” strategy is negatively correlated with the other alternatives 
(most strongly with switch). The “Switch” and “Leverage” strategies are weakly 
correlated, as are the “Leverage” and “Multi-use” strategies. The “Switch” and “Multi-
use” strategies stand out as strongly and positively correlated.  
 
--- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE --- 
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4.2 Case recommendations 
This analysis led to incremental insights about our set of alternatives, without 
fundamentally shaking our confidence in them. The findings were used to identify 
directions for improvement of the alternative set, which were translated into changes in 
definitions of specific alternatives. The general recommendations were to:  
1) Refine understanding of commercial and regulatory risk; 
2) Make the "Multi-use” and “Switch” strategies more divergent (assuming that 
the results do not change after the the previous step); and  
3) Increase the spread among alternatives with regard to commercial and 
regulatory risk.  
Recommendation (3) could be enacted by modifying alternatives to increase their 
variation, or by adding new alternatives. We concluded that an ideal alternative set would 
combine recommendations (2) and (3), and make the “Multi-use” and “Switch” strategies 
more divergent on commercial and regulatory risk. For example, “Switch” could be made 
more commercially risky but less risky in terms of regulation, while making “Multi-use” 
could take on more regulatory risk.  
The specific suggested directions for improvement of the alternative set were 
developed in an informal way based on the statistics described. It is worth mentioning 
that this approach could be formalized to varying degrees. Of course, spreadsheets could 
automatically calculate results of any contemplated change in strategies on the statistics 
calculated here – spread on scores for each attribute, variation on scores within an 
alternative, cartesian distance between alternatives, spread on average scores of each 
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alternative, etc.  Extending this idea would be a one-way sensitivity analysis on these 
statistics with respect to incremental changes in each alternative. Results could be used to 
generate a list of suggested one-way (or, with automation, more complex) changes that 
are effective enough to pass a screen, e.g., increasing average differentiation over all 
attributes by at least 0.2 and increasing the average difference in alternatives’ average 
scores by at least 0.1 with a degradation in average score of less than 0.1. The question of 
whether the suggested changes translate to practical actions should probably to be left to 
human experts. 
Once the changes in the case were suggested, it was relatively easy to identify a 
way to implement them. As noted, the original alternatives could have been stated 
literally in terms of which medical indications would go with which of three possible 
drug formulations. Specifically, there was a current formulation that was already in use, a 
new formulation similar to the current one but without one of its potential drawbacks, and 
an even newer formulation also without the main drawback of the current formulation 
with potentially greater or lesser benefits. In the “Multi-use” strategy, it was possible to 
re-assign the existing product formulation from innovative indications to a more basic 
application. At the same time, in the “Switch” strategy it was possible to assign the first 
new formulation to low-tech applications while reserving the newest formulation for new 
indications. This pair of changes led to precisely the desired change in differences 
between the two strategies and the corresponding desired differentiation in the set of 
alternatives as a whole.  The product manager suggested a further improvement of 
assigning one other potential indication to the second formulation in the “Multi-use” 
strategy. 
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We did not consider certain other possible interpretations of the statistics, but 
these might merit exploration in future applications. For example, it is not clear that lack 
of divergence is always a shortcoming – perhaps the reason none of the alternatives had 
high commercial risk is that this is not really variable, or that it is easily optimized. 
Similarly, it is possible that alternatives achieve similar levels with respect to attributes, 
but achieve them through very different lower level tactics, i.e., their similar performance 
on attributes is mere coincidence. With more experience, it will become clear which 
questions of this type are important.  
At the next team meeting, it was agreed that would be the basis for further 
modeling, assessment and analysis, all of which commenced soon after. Prior to the 
completion of the project, largely unanticipated outside events changed the business 
environment enough that the product was essentially abandoned (and therefore the 
“Minimum Investment” strategy became the obvious choice) and the decision analysis 
stopped, so there is no way to compare the ultimate incremental value of the new 
alternatives generated with this process.   
Up to this point, the process innovation had tangible effects. The analysis led 
directly and quickly to insights about and improvements to the set of alternatives. The 
ratings were used to characterize the set of alternatives. The characterization was used to 
develop recommendations on how to improve the set as a whole, as well as specific ideas 
about where to change alternatives. These recommendations evoked specific suggestions 
for changes in the definitions of two of the alternatives.  
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5. Conclusion 
A refinement was introduced to improve the alternative generation step of the 
DDP. This is a step that is often suspect, and the suggested change, though simple, has a 
theoretical basis that should increase differentiation of the alternatives that are defined. It 
should also make more defensible a consultant’s assertion that this aspect of decision 
quality has been achieved.  
As a process innovation, the case described was a success. The main question was 
whether the new step would provide any incremental benefit. The answer appears to be 
yes. As Clemen and Kwit (2001) have noted, it is very difficult to identify the actual 
value added, but we have available one piece of evidence of success. Specifically, the 
client could have asked us to retain our original set of alternatives but instead dictated 
that we work with the revised set of alternatives and then proceed with the rest of the 
standard DDP.  
This revealed preference indicates that the set of alternatives was substantially 
improved by the guidance directly attributable to the new step. A secondary question was 
how much this added step would cost in terms of additional time, discomfort, etc. In fact, 
the additional analysis from this step required only a simple spreadsheet. The step was 
easily explained to client team members who were already familiar with decision 
analysis. It took less than one additional person day to conduct assessments, and a little 
more to analyze the data and develop recommendations. The client team found the 
discussion engaging. An incidental benefit of this discussion was helping people make 
the shift to thinking in terms of evaluation, which would be the next step of the DDP.   
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Although the case was an application of the DDP, the present ideas may be 
applicable in other incarnations of decision analysis. The integration of strategy tables 
with an MCDA modeling perspective seems promising. Decision analysts may improve 
alternative sets by considering, without too much effort, how alternatives differ in certain 
attribute dimensions and not just in terms of their inputs.  
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Table 1: Stylized version of strategy table developed with client team.  
 
 
 
Key:  
 
I   =   Minimum Investment strategy 
S  =   Switch strategy 
L  =   Leverage strategy 
G  =  Grow strategy 
U  =  Multi-Use Products strategy 
 
IIIII  LNone 
S UL GUHigh
UL  SUL USMedium
G  LGG   SS GLow
SpeedSales/
Mktg
New 
Indication 
Trials
CapacitySafety  & 
Efficacy 
Trials
Strategic          
Dimension  
Resources 
allocated
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Table 2a and 2b: Raw assessments and standard deviations (1 = best quartile, etc) 
Judge A Resources 
used 
Timing Org’l  
complexity 
Market  
complexity 
Tech 
risk 
Reg 
risk 
Commercial 
downside  
risk 
Commercial  
upside  
potential 
Min 
invest 
1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 
Grow  3 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Switch 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 
Leverage 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 1 
Multi-use 3 3 2 4 3 2 2 2 
Std Dev 1.10 1.14 0.71 1.30 0.89 0.55 0.71 1.10 
 
Judge B Resources 
used 
Timing Org’l 
complexity 
Market  
complexity 
Tech 
risk 
Reg 
risk 
Commercial 
downside  
risk 
Commercial  
upside  
potential 
Min 
invest 
1 1 1 1 1 3 2 4 
Grow 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 3 
Switch 3 3 2 3 4 1 3 2 
Leverage 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 1 
Multi-use 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 1 
StdDev 1.14 1.14 1.10 0.89 1.14 1.14 0.55 1.30 
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Table 3: Average judge assessments 
 
(A+B)/2 Re- 
sources 
used 
Timing Org’l 
com-
plexity 
Market  
com-
plexity 
Tech  
risk 
Reg  
risk 
Comm. 
down-
side 
Comm.  
upside  
Ave-
rage 
Min invest 1 1 1 1 1 2.5 2.5 4  1.75 
Grow 2.5 2 2 1.5 2 3.5 1.5 1.5  2.1875 
Switch 3 3 2 3 3.5 1.5 2.5 2  2.5625 
Leverage 4 4 3.5 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 1  2.875 
Multi-use 3 3 2 3.5 3 2 2.5 1.5 2.5625 
Average 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3875 
Std Dev 1.10 1.14 0.89 1.04 1.00 0.74 0.45 1.15  0.43 
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Table 4: Attributes oriented strategy table. 
 
 
 
ILL4
G
U  L
S
U
SL
U SU  S3
S
L I U S
U
L  I 
G
L
G U S G
G
2
L
G UGS
II
G
II I1
Com-
mercial 
upside
potential
Com-
mercial 
downside
risk
Regulatory 
risk
Technical 
risk
Market
Complexity
Organiz-
ational
Complexity
TimingResources 
used
Quartile
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Table 5: Differences between judges’ assessments 
 
Judge B 
score – 
Judge A 
score 
Re- 
source 
use 
 
Timing Org’l 
com-
plexity 
Market  
com-
plexity 
Tech. 
risk 
Reg. 
risk 
Comm. 
down-
side 
Comm. 
upside  
Distance Correl  
A&B 
Min invest 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 1.41 0.89 
Grow -1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2.24 0.51 
Switch 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 1.73 0.73 
Leverage 0 0 1 1 0 -1 1 0 2.00 0.77 
Multi-use 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 -1 1.73 0.64 
Distance 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.73 1.00 2.00 2.24 1.41   
Correl 
A&B 
0.92 1.00 0.97 0.77 0.93 0.48 0.00 0.84   
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Table 6: Similarity between alternatives: correlation of attribute scores, using 
average of both judges. 
 
 
Correlation 
 
Min 
invest 
Grow Switch Leverage Multi 
Min invest      
Grow 0.30     
Switch -0.65 -0.52    
Leverage -0.65 0.12 0.35   
Multi-use -0.58 -0.36 0.84 0.30  
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